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This thesis outlines the steps an insurgency normally takes and
describes the present strategy used to combat the insurgency in South
Vietnam as well as the measures of effectiveness currently being used
in that country. The need for a measure of effectiveness relating
directly to the people of the country engaged in counter insurgency
operations is established and methodology for an allegiance measure,
based on current, wel 1 -documented psychological testing techniques
is proposed.
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I. INTRODUCTION
It is an axiom of any type of analysis that in order for an analyst
to be able to measure the degree of success an organization may enjoy,
he must know the nature of the organization's chosen objective in rather
precise terms. This is also true and is sometimes more of a problem to
an analyst in a counter i nsurgency environment. It is sometimes helpful
if the analyst in any environment knows what the organization's overall
strategy is and what the strategies and objectives of the antagonists
are. This paper will discuss the strategies and objectives of an insur-
gent as well as counter insurgent strategies and objectives, and will
describe an attempt to formulate or develop a measure of effectiveness
for counter insurgency operations.
Strategy for Counter insurgency
One counter insurgent strategy emphasizes destroying the enemy's
battle forces. This is basically the same strategy employed during
World Wars I and II and Korea and, on the surface, does not appear to
be an unreasonable one. In the current conflict with the Viet Cong,
such a defeat might take more time, men, and money; but there should be
little doubt that the military prowess of the United States could even-
tually bring about such a defeat.
A better understanding of the organization and modus operandi of
the Viet Cong in particular and the insurgents in general suggests that
the military defeat of an insurgent force is not likely to bring lasting
peace. The insurgent has his base in the people of the country and it
is in the people that an insurgency is won or lost. The complicity of
the people is necessary for an insurgent victory and without their sup-
port, the insurgent is forced to either turn from guerrilla warfare to
conventional warfare (where he may lack sufficient resources to achieve
victory), or to abandon his effort altogether. Because the insurgent
has to win the loyalties of the people in order to effect a victory, it
becomes an important task of the counter insurgent to re-win these same
loyalties and to force the insurgent away from the people. Thus a pri-
mary objective of the counterinsurgent becomes restoring or gaining the
loyalty of the people.
Measures of Effectiveness
The important problem of measuring these loyalties or measuring
changes in loyalty from pro-insurgent through neutrality to pro-counter-
insurgent is difficult. U.S. Forces in Vietnam are currently using two
different methods to attempt this measurement. These methods employ be-
havioral indicators of loyalty together with value judgments made by
U.S. officers. This paper proposes a method of measuring attitudes and
loyalties borrowed from psychological testing methods as a partial solu-
tion to the problem of developing a measure of effectiveness for counter-
insurgent operations.
Def i ni tions
Before proceeding, the following definitions are listed to preclude
any confusion concerning the terms most often used when talking about
insurgency and counter i nsurgency operations.
The word guerr i 1 la is of Spanish origin, literally meaning a "small
war" and a guerri 1 lero is any person waging such a small war. This use
of guerrilla has largely been abandoned and it is now used to refer to
the person engaged in the waging of a small, unconventional war.
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Guerr i 1 la warfare is the employment of guerrillas in one or more of
three possible uses: (1) they may be used against a foreign invader,
e.g., the Spanish irregulars and civilians who harassed Napoleon and his
troops during his attempted expulsion of the English from Spain; (2)
they may be a weapon of insurrection, e.g., Mao Tse-tung's conquest of
China; (3) or they may be the agent of a foreign power, as some claim
the Viet Cong in South Vietnam to be. Whatever the use of guerrillas
might be,
"guerrilla warfare is characterized by maximum employment of de-
deption, concealment, intelligence, and improvisation; by surprise
attacks and quick withdrawals; above all, by the avoidance of
open tests of strength with the enemy unless success is assured."
(12)
A guerr i 1 la movement or i nsurgency , regardless of its motivation,
may be defined as the overall effort to seize control of a society and
may be further defined as
"a movement relying on the support of the people, fighting the
government administering his (their) country for an ideal believed
not otherwise attainable; and avoiding combat except under circum-
stances of his (their) own choosing." (12)
An insurgency has three, four, or more stages of growth and usually em-
ploys guerrilla warfare in but one of its stages. Each stage of growth
has large variations in its time schedule and in its actual makeup, not
only from country to country, but also from operational area to opera-
tional area within a given country.
Insurgents refers to the normally small group of dissidents who
have caused the insurgency development, i.e., the brains behind the
movement. Insurgent forces and counter i nsurgent forces are sometimes
used in place of the words guerrillas and counterguerr i 1 las, respective-
ly. The counter i nsurgent is the incumbent government and/or intervening
power trying to defeat the insurgency and depose the insurgents from
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whatever power they have gained.
Organization of This Thesis
This thesis begins by discussing the essential characteristics
of an insurgency and then examines possible strategies to combat an
insurgency.
After discussing existing measures of effectiveness for counter'
insurgency operations, we shall investigate an alternate approach
utilizing psychological testing methods. Then we shall explore the
possible content of questionnaires which use attitude scaling.
1
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II. THE EVOLUTION OF AN INSURGENCY
An insurgency generally begins when a group of individuals (the
insurgents) becomes dissatisfied with the existing government, for one
or more of any number of possible reasons, and decides to attempt to
gain control of the government and of the society of the country in
general. Their organization, their operation, and their very existence
will initially be of a clandestine nature, hidden from the government
until they wish to make their presence known. Remaining in hiding, how-
ever, means that they will not be able to openly recruit others to their
cause, buy weapons, nor do any of the myriad other things that must be
done prior to waging open warfare or rebellion. In order to compensate
for this deficiency and weakness, and to shield their covert activities
from the government, they will attempt to enlist the aid of the populace
and to dissociate it from the government. If they are able to gain
physical control of the population and to obtain its active support,
they may be well on the way to winning because
"...in the final analysis, the exercise of political power
depends on the tacit or explicit agreement of the population
or at worst, on its submi ssi veness." (5)
Insurgents require certain physical inputs from the populace for
their guerrilla forces, such as recruits, information, shelter, and food,
once the insurgency has reached the guerrilla warfare phase. Before the
populace can be persuaded to supply these inputs, the insurgents must
have some cause that will lure people voluntarily to their side of the
conflict. This cause must be plausible enough to attract initial sup-
porters who will be able to sway public opinion and bring ever-i ncreasi-ng
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numbers of people into the insurgent camp. This cause will probably be
the one that forced the dissident group to attempt the overthrow of the
government in the first place, unless the dissidents are in reality
agents of a foreign power or are trying to wrest control of the country
for personal gain. Although in the latter cases the cause may be ficti-
tious in the eyes of the insurgent leaders, it must nevertheless seem
real and plausible to the people.
This cause may take many forms, such as one appealing to the intel-
lectuals and the proletariat in an industrialized society, or to the
peasant class in an agrarian society; or one of independence from a
colonial power. The more closely this cause is allied to the religious,
social, political, and personal aspirations of the society from which the
insurgents seek support, the more support they will be able to muster.
The Four Phase Concept Of Insurgency
Once the insurgents have a plausible cause, an insurgency usually
develops according to a wel 1 -documented pattern. The four phases of the
development of an insurgency are summarized in the following paragraphs.
(3)
Phase I - The recruitment of a small band of followers, consisting of
active as well as passive (but sympathetic) supporters, and the forma-
tion of a political party are the initial steps to be taken. These
loyal supporters create front groups and infiltrate existing social and
political organizations. The party is organized with its base in the
proletariat or, in the case of underdeveloped countries having a small
or nonexistent proletariat, in the peasant class. Once this has been
accomplished, two strategies are generally available; (1) power seizure
through legal election or appointment; (2) power seizure through armed
struggle if the first alternative fails (as it usually does) on at least
a nationwide basis.
Phase II - This phase begins when the party leadership has decided that
the time for armed insurrection is nearing. Underground cells are for-
med, communication and supply lines between them are established, and
the weapons that will be needed are collected and stored. Agitators and
sympathetic news media spread ant i -government propaganda, and mobs and
riots discredit the government, showing sympathetic but passive follow-
ers of the insurgent movement that resistance to the government is pos-
sible. Persuasion, threats, and violence are used to subvert police and
government officials and to gain control of towns and villages. Intel-
ligence nets are formed, small armed groups come into being and control
of the villages is consolidated.
Phase III - This phase is the guerrilla warfare phase, the armed insur-
rection by which an ultimately successful insurgent will gain military
and political control of 80 to 95% of the land mass of the country.
Large military units are trained and equipped, large numbers of weapons
are procured, and regular bases are acquired and established for use by
the larger, more conventional military units of Phase IV.
Because the insurgent military forces are initially much weaker
than those of the counter insurgent, a direct confrontation between the
two would almost certainly result in the annihilation of the insurgent.
Thus, the insurgent leaders may select as the first operating areas for
the guerrilla bands those regions or districts of the country where:
(1) The strength of the insurgent's organization among the
population has been ensured by the preliminary work of
the party.
(2) The center of the counter i nsurgent power is far removed.
(3) The terrain and poor government communications continue
to make them inaccessible.
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(k) Both sides of administrative borders are contained within
them, making it difficult for the enemy to coordinate his
reaction.
As insurgent strength increases, the movement will expand into
areas where its initial strength was small and thus enlarge the geogra-
phical area of control. (5)
The objective and summarization of Phase III of an insurgency may
be summarized by the following quote from Galula.
"What makes it possible for the guerrilla to survive and expand?
The complicity of the population. This is the key to guerrilla
warfare, indeed to the insurgency. The complicity of the popu-
lation is not to be confused with the sympathy of the population;
the former is active, the latter inactive, and the popularity of
the insurgent's cause is insufficient by itself to transform
sympathy into complicity. The participation of the population
in the conflict is obtained, above all, by a political organiza-
tion (the party) living among the population, backed by force
(the guerrilla gangs), which eliminates the open enemies, intimi-
dates the potential ones, and relies on those among the population
who actively support the insurgents..." (5)
The guerrilla operations will be planned primarily to obtain sup-
port from the population and secondly to disrupt the counter insurgents *
operations. An ambush against a counter i nsurgent patrol should be a
military success, but more importantly, it should bring the support of
a village or implicate the people of that village against the counter-
insurgent. In other words, attrition of the enemy is a by-product of
guerrilla warfare, not its essential goal. (5)
Phase IV - This phase is marked by the creation of large regular mili-
tary units, capable of defeating the counter i nsurgent forces in large-
scale conventional warfare. If he has good military assets, solid
political structuring, popular mobilization in the areas of his control,
good operational subversive activities by his underground agents in the
counteri nsurgent 's areas, and psychological superiority; the scope and
scale of the insurgent's operations will increase rapidly. A series of
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offensives will be aimed at the complete destruction of the counterin-
surgent. (5)
An Objection To The Four Phase Concept of Insurgencies
Valeriano and Bohannan refer to this four phase concept of an in-
surgency as the Si no-Vietnamese concept and they warn against its use
as an analytical tool by the counter insurgent in each and every case of
insurgency. Their contention is that the concept of operations as out-
lined here is the doctrine of Chinese and Vietnamese Communist leaders
and that it is not the established or traditional guerrilla practice.
'There is, however, a course for guerrilla warfare, an approach
to successful revolution, that closely parallels the traditional
guerrilla practice. In this, the guerrilla seeks to weaken
counterguerri 1 la forces and the government they support by petty
actions and petty harassments, inducing the government to waste
its strength and lower the morale of its people by futile blows
at the guerrilla, who is not there to receive them. Meanwhile,
the guerrilla and his political leaders concentrate on building
up popular support, organized and unorganized. At an opportune
time, a quick blow, a quick "national revolution" spearheaded
by the guerrilla force or, as in Russia, by political leaders,
can capture or seduce the key officials of government, leaving
the armed forces leader less and the instrumentalities of govern-
ment open to guerrilla control.
"Because of the wide dissemination of the Si no-Vietnamese con-
cept, it appears especially important that the intention of the
guerrilla forces be quickly and correctly recognized. It is
critically important that counterguerri 1 la forces not be lulled
by misconceptions, that an intended national revolution not be
mistaken for the early stage of the Sino-Vietnamese pattern.
If this mistake is made, a successful revolution can occur while
counterguerri 1 la forces rest secure in the belief that an attempt
at overthrow of the government is yet far away." (12)
It is probable that such a quick coup de main will be over too
quickly for the incumbent government to be able to ask for a major
power's intervention in their behalf. Or, if a major power is able to
intervene in response to a request by the incumbent government, it is
unlikely it will become involved in a protracted counter insurgency be-
cause the insurgents will not have built up the organization and net-
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work that the Si no-Vietnamese concept requires.
Therefore, our interests for the purposes of this paper will center
on Phase III of the Si no-Vietnamese concept of insurgency, because it is
in this phase that the United States seems most likely to become invol-
ved in an insurgency, as an intervening power.
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III. COUNTERINSURGENT STRATEGIES
Military Defeat of The Insurgent
One strategy for counter insurgents that enjoys some measure of
popularity is the strategy of complete military defeat of the insurgent
forces. The concept of total defeat of the opponent was employed in
World Wars I and II, but to effect such a defeat of an insurgent in a
country of any size would probably require more time, men, and money
than either of those two conflicts and the results would not be as clear
cut as were the victories for the Allies in 1918 and 19*+5. There should
be little doubt that the military machine of a powerful nation could
eventually bring about such a defeat. A strategy of pure military action
would provide valuable propaganda ammunition for the insurgents, however,
and it would also provoke considerable popular embitterment toward the
government, due to the unexplained uprooting of villages and their nor-
mal way of life, not to mention the tragic but inevitable killing of
civilians, possibly on a large scale. The use of military force alone
does not resolve problems relating to the attitudes and loyalties of the
people and the major role they play in an insurgency situation. The
problem facing the counter i nsurgent is not one of clearing an area of
insurgent forces, but it is, in reality, one of persuading the people
of the advantages of keeping their area clear and of thus invoking their
help in the counterinsurgent effort. The problem has been clearly sta-
ted by Paret and Shy:
"It is erroneous to think that military defeat pure and simple will
be the final solution. Unless the population has been weaned away
from the guerrilla and his cause, unless reforms and re-education
have attacked the psychological base of guerrilla action, unless
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the political network backing him up has been destroyed, military
defeat is only a pause and fighting can easily erupt again." (8)
Transitional societies appear to be the most liable to insurgent
action. Within them, there are usually strong anti -government attitudes,
traditionally viewing the government as an opponent rather than as a
collaborator. It is not realistic to expect that these deeply ingrained
attitudes will be changed significantly by five years or possibly even
twenty-five years of work by a dedicated counter insurgent . Actually,
increased popular support and political loyalty for the government by
changes in these attitudes is more likely to be a consequence than a
cause of counter insurgent success. The most that can be hoped for in
the short run of counteinsurgent effort is an influencing of popular
behavior and action so that attitudes and loyalties can be altered in
the long run. If, after the insurgent is defeated and political unity
is established, the government works very hard to establish a rapport
with the people and is able to show the people progress toward filling
their needs, the attitudes of the people may begin to change and real
loyalty for the government begin to develop.
It has been suggested that a successful counter i nsurgent strategy
should include actions aimed at influencing the people toward more pro-
government behavior as well as operations that will defeat the insur-
gents militarily. If the insurgents are defeated militarily but retain
support of the citizenry, the hard core insurgents will revert to the
clandestine cell type of operation that prevailed in Phases I and II and
wait until a more favorable atmosphere for their operations occurs.
It is also essential that the counter i nsurgent either negate the
original insurgent cause or find some way to mollify the populace so
that the cause loses its importance to them. There have been instances
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in which counterinsurgents have been able to effectively adopt the in-
surgents' cause as their own, thereby eliminating or reducing this
source of popular support for the insurgents. As an example, the insur-
gents' cause in Malaya was to achieve independence from British colonial
rule. When the British promised the people independence at a specified
time in return for cooperation with the government, however, the insur-
gents' raison d'etre lost its meaning and the insurgency was defeated.
The war was long and costly in both money and men but the insurgents
were destined to failure after they lost the cause they needed to rally
the people."
This is not to say, however, that the negation of the cause will,
by and of itself, assure the victory of the counteinsurgent : it is a
necessary but not sufficient requisite for victory. Once the insurgent
infrastructure is organized and functioning, the existence of a cause
loses much of its relative importance and the negation of it may make
the conduct of insurgency operations more difficult, but not impossible.
The people were cajoled to the side of the insurgent originally by means
of a cause that was attractive to them and their complicity with the in-
surgent is maintained by their belief in that cause, if it still exists;
or, out of a desire to maintain the status quo if there is no real bene-
fit to be gained by switching allegiance to the government, or counter-
insurgent. If the insurgent finds that the cause or the status quo is
"It must not be thought that the British actually lost a larger
objective by their granting independence to Malaya. According to the
signs of the times, independence would have been granted before too
much more time had elapsed anyway, and because of their action, the
British gained an ally for the West and the Communists lost a potential
satel 1 ite.
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not sufficient to maintain this complicity, however, he may resort to
terrorism to maintain it.
The tactic of terrorism is much easier to combat than an ideal or
a genuine grievance, because the people will more readily help fight
against an insurgent who needs terror to maintain control than against
one who is supposedly championing their grievances.
The Need for Reform
The existence of a cause is often indicative of a need for large-
scale governmental reform and it is because the insurgents have promised
to alleviate the hardships caused by this need that they have gained
their initial popular support. Most of the transitional countries, by
Western standards, do need some degree of social, economic, and/or poli-
tical reform and such reform could be one of the goals of that country
or an intervening power. Problems arising wherein the government of the
transitional country may be unwilling or unable to effect the reform
measures that are needed are very important. They are, however, also
very complex and are beyond the scope of this paper and will not be
treated here.
Present Strategy in South Vietnam
In the preceding chapters, we have established that although the
military defeat of the insurgent is necessary, it must be coupled with
a program of pacification and civic action that will help promote deeper
pro-government attitudes among the villagers. For example, the strategy
currently employed by U.S. forces in South Vietnam is capable of fulfil-
ling the military and pacification tasks set for it. This strategy is
aimed at separating the people from the Viet Cong insurgent and giving
tangible evidence to these people that the Government of South Vietnam,
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with the United States as their ally, offer a better way of life than do
the Communists.
This strategy employs a three-pronged offensive, consisting of large-
unit operations, small-unit or counterguerr i 1 la operations, and the paci-
fication programs. The large-unit operations are directed against the
Viet Cong and North Vietnamese main force units and are meant to clear an
area of large enemy units and keep them on the move, whi le the counter-
guerrilla, or small-unit operations are what eventually rout out the
guerrillas, denying them access to the populace. The pacification pro-
grams follow in the wake of the combative efforts and provide protection
against Viet Cong attacks, medical assistance, food, re-establishment of
local government, and other forms of assistance. (7) Medical treatment
and the feeding of villagers during military operations serves to minimize
the resentment and ill feeling whiah would be generated by the inconven-
ience of village search, etc.
While humane treatment of the populace by the military is important,
the Revolutionary Development Teams now working in parts of South Vietnam
seem to be the best solution to date to the problem of implementing the
pacification programs, however. These teams of trained Vietnamese civi-
lians are probably much more acceptable to the people than teams composed
of U.S. military personnel. The U.S. forces are alien to the country and
to the people and will rarely be able to establish the rapport with the
people that can be established by other Vietnamese. The military forces
have other tasks to perform, equally as important as pacification, and
are not trained to handle the detailed and comprehensive Revolutionary
Development Program that is necessary. They will be forced to take the
initiative in these programs until the area is secure enough to permit
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the introduction of the Revolutionary Development Teams and/or until,
such teams are trained and available, but it should not become the pri-
mary task of the military forces for any lengthy period of time.
The current manner in which this three-pronged offensive is employed
is of some interest and an analogy to the wave theory of radiation might
prove useful. An initial base of operations is established by the coun-
ter insurgents on the coast of the country in which the counter insurgency
is being fought, if possible, so that there are only three sides of the
camp to be defended by the ground units and so that the problems of re-
supply are minimized. As soon as possible, the large-unit operations
are begun, designed to keep the larger guerrilla units on the move and to
force the guerrillas to abandon any bases he may have near the friendly
base. The small -unit operations next begin to seek out and apprehend the
village infiltrators and agents, confining their efforts to a rough semi-
circle with the base camp as a center. The initial pacification teams
then move into the area and begin the pre-planned pacification and civic
action programs. They remain in the area until such time as a Revolu-
tionary Development Team is able to move into the area. As the unsur-
gents are forced back from the base camp and the people begin to accept
the government and U.S. forces, the semicircle of progress advances,
much like a very large, slow-moving wave front.
The insurgent forces may attempt to move into the area behind the
'wave front 1 and re-establish their influence among the people. The man-
power requirements necessary to leave defenders behind in every village
to deter insurgent reappearances are beyond the realm of possibility for
either the U.S. or the South Vietnamese regular forces. As the U.S. and
South Vietnamese forces move through an area, civilians from the village
2k
are trained, armed, and left to provide stop-gap defense against the Viet
Cong. Communications are established with nearby units of U.S. or South
Vietnamese regular forces which will respond whenever large units of Viet
Cong are encountered by the civilian defenders.
This strategy obviously has more merit than the one whereby a large
unit moves into an area, engages the enemy, and then departs from the
area altogether. Large-unit hit-and-run tactics have merit in that they
keep the enemy on the move and disrupt the establishment and maintenance
of his bases, as well as confiscate his feed and arms reserves, but they
have little permanent value as far as an ultimate victory over the in-
surgents is concerned because they have no permanent effect on the
allegiance of the people.
This three-pronged strategy attempts to accomplish most of what has
been deemed necessary for any strategy in an insurgency situation and it
should not be too difficult for experienced leaders to evaluate or mea-
sure the success of the large and small unit efforts. Measuring the
success of the pacification programs is much more difficult, since it
involves measuring the attitudes of the people and their pro-govern-
ment feelings, and the measurement of such intangibles is seldom easy.
The next chapter discusses two current methods which attempt to measure
the success of the pacification or Revolutionary Development programs.
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IV. PRESENT MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS
The Marine Corps Method
The Marines, presently engaged in the fight against the Viet Cong
in the northern provinces of South Vietnam, have used, for approximately
one and a half years, a method which attempts to measure the success of
their pacification programs in that area. This method is based on
awarding points to villages for the completion or partial achievement of
several pacification tasks. Villages are scored during completion of a
worksheet ( Appendix A ) by a Civic Action Officer. These worksheets are
submitted on a specific date each month to a higher command for evalua-
tion and analysis.
The several tasks are grouped into five major categories of concern:
(1) destruction of organized Viet Cong military forces,
(2) destruction of Viet Cong infrastructure,
(3) establishment of local security,
(k) establishment of local governments,
and
(5) completion of initial civic improvement programs.
A village may be awarded a maximum of twenty points for each of the five
major categories and the total number of points awarded a village is
taken to indicate the percentage of pacification achieved in that
vi 1 lage."
On maps of the tactical areas, the villages are plotted according
to their computed percentages of pacification. The area, civilian
The maximum total points = 100 = 100% pacified.
26
population, and the number of villages falling under each classification
of per cent pacified are then listed in a chart below the map. Thus one
is able to see, albeit roughly, how the pacification programs and mili-
tary operations have affected the area and how successful or unsuccess-
ful they have been from one month to the next.
The Military Advisory Command, Vietnam, Method
In January, 1967> tne Military Advisory Command, Vietnam instituted
a new method of measuring counter insurgency progress in South Vietnam.
The methodology is similar to the Marine method except that no single
value is used to estimate the level of pacification of a hamlet. One
of the most noteworthy accomplishments is the fact that this method of
measuring the pacification or Revolutionary Development progress, as it
is termed by the Advisory Command, represents the first time each and
every hamlet in South Vietnam not under overt Viet Cong control has been
measured on a regularly scheduled basis.
Each hamlet is visited monthly by the subsector advisor who ap-
praises six factors per hamlet:
(1) Viet Cong military activities,
(2) Viet Cong political and subversive activities,
' (3) security (friendly capabilities),
{k) administrative and political activities,
(5) health, education, and welfare,
and
(6) economic development.
The first three factors relate to hamlet security and the second three
to Revolutionary Development. Thus, the Hamlet Evaluation System con-
stitutes a two-pronged measure of effectiveness. Working in conjunction
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with his Vietnamese counterpart, the advisor grades each hamlet in his
subsector on the basis of a five category scale (E = worst and A = best)
for each of three indicators per factor. To assist the advisor in
rating the hamlets, detailed definitions of the eighteen indicators for
each rating category are given in the instructions and partial defini-
tions are contained on the Havlet Evaluation Worksheet, a sample of
which is presented in Appendix B . In addition to the eighteen indica-
tors, there are eight problem areas on the worksheet that are to be
evaluated by the advisor.
A Hamlet Evaluation Summary Form is submitted by the subsector
advisor via the sector advisor and Province Team to the Revolutionary
Development Support Directorate for machine processing and printing of
data concerning that sector. The Directorate is also responsible for
the final evaluation and derivation of alphabetical and numerical hamlet
scores.
Although the advisor does not evaluate the eighteen indicators
completely by himself, the evaluations are based on value judgments.
Value judgments may be very good in accurately assessing a situation
but they are liable to inconsistencies and personal biases over a period
of time and especially between individuals, no matter how clear and pre-
cise the instructions.
The two-pronged measure of effectiveness used by the Advisory
Command might be used to compare the measured security of an area and
the measure of the Revolutionary Development to see if they are cor-
related. The Revolutionary Development measure is expected to be low
if the security measure is low, but if the security measure were high
and the Revolutionary Development measure were still low, further in-
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vestigation of the techniques of measuring and/or the area and its
people would probably be necessary. Similarly, if the states were re-
versed, with a high Revolutionary Development measure and a low security
measure, it might be suspected that there were something wrong with
either one or both of the measures or that for some reason the people in
that area were highly motivated toward the side of the government, in-
dicating that more effort in that community might yield larger benefits
than usua 1
.
The entries on the various worksheets of the Marine and the Advi-
sory Command methods are more or less the value judgments of the Civic
Action Officers or Advisors. The value judgments of an experienced and
conscientious officer may give or reflect an accurate accounting of the
situation. It is, however, quite possible that there is a limited num-
ber of experienced officers who will conscientiously perform a job that
is ofttimes odious to an infantry officer. Studies have shown that even
with something as objective as measuring a cylinder with a micrometer, a
myriad of minute errors combine to produce some variation from measure-
ment to measurement. If there are inconsistencies among objective mea-
surements, it may be assumed that there will very probably be larger
inconsistencies for measurements as subjective as those contained in the
Marine and Advisory Command methods. It is therefore likely that there
will be inconsistencies among the monthly reports of each officer as
well as among reportings of different officers.
These methods have filled a definite need since their introduction
in that they attempt to measure the success of U.S. and South Vietnamese
attempts at pacification of the people of South Vietnam. It is felt
that more accurate measures can be developed, however, using methods
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based on psychological testing techniques. The following chapter dis-
cusses the possibility of adapting these psychological methods to a
counterinsurgency measure of effectiveness.
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V. USING PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTING METHODS
TO DEVELOP A MEASURE OF EFFECTIVENESS
Introduction To Psychological Testing Methods
It appears that a method whereby the people of an insurgency
wracked country are used to evaluate their own attitudes would be of
value in developing a measure of effectiveness. It is felt that the
key to an accurate measure lies with the people themselves who seem to
be an obvious source for answers to the problem of measuring loyalty and
a 1 1 eg i a nee.
This is not to say that direct questioning of the villagers about
their loyalties would necessarily yield useful information. There is a
possibility that the answers to such questions would be what the vil-
lager (if he understood the question to begin with) thought his inter-
rogator wanted to hear rather than what he actually felt. In spite of
this possible detriment, the use of the people to evaluate their own
attitudes is worthy of our consideration.
In essence, what we want to do is to
"...devise a method whereby the distribution of attitude of a
group on a specified issue may be represented in the form of a
frequency distribution." (10)
The problem of measuring an intangible is that no unit of measurement is
defined for the range of attitudes, from those most strongly opposed to
the issue at one end of the scale to those as strongly in favor of it at
the other end. The crux of the problem is the definition of this unit
of measurement and four possible methods for its determination have been
developed over the last few decades.
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Definitively, attitude is used
"...to denote the sum total of a man's inclinations and feelings,
prejudice or bias, preconceived notions, ideas, fears, threats,
and convictions about any specified topic," (9)
while opinion is used to mean a verbal expression of an attitude. Be-
cause an opinion symbolizes an attitude, we shall use various opinions
as the means for measuring attitude. Lest there be confusion later, the
objective index is herein referred to as the statement or opinion while
the inferred subjective inclination of the person being examined is
ca 1 led the attitude variable .
It is fairly obvious that some discrepancy exists between a person's
opinions and overt acts, which we will use here as an index, and the
true attitude which we infer from such an index. Every time we measure
something however, we postulate an abstract continuum, such as height or
weight, and the thing measured is referenced to that continuum through
one or more indices. The actual values of what we are trying to measure
are inferred from the relative consistency of the several indices, since
we never know the values exactly. For example, a retail dealer attempts
to measure public good will toward his establishment by several indices,
such as the number of active and potential customers that enter his
store. It is this same type of situation with which we are dealing when
we attempt to measure attitude. Thus, this discrepancy between the in-
dices of measurement and actuality is universal.
An example of the problem of the indices of measurement and the
abstract continuum is given in the figure below, which represents an
attitude variable, the level of belief in prohibition, including a zone
of neutrality with regard to the attitudes toward alcoholic consumption.
This attitude variable is not in fact an actual variable but is an hypo-
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thetical construct, an intangible attribute that we assume to exist and
attempt to measure. Attitudes may be considered variables because they
generally vary from person to person. A person who is generally opposed
to the consumption of alcohol would be represented somewhere to the left
of the neutral zone while an imbiber would be represented somewhere to
the right of the zone of neutrality. It is not difficult to conceive of
a frequency distribution that would represent the distribution of atti-
tude in a specified group of people, such as the inhabitants of a
vi 1 lage.
Figure 1
A frequency distribution representing the distribution of attitude of





At any particular point on the base line of the frequency distri-
bution, there is represented a certain attitude toward the issue, in
this case, prohibition. We want to know how frequently this attitude
occurs among the members of the group we are investigating and this is
represented by the ordinate of the distribution at that point. Because
of the imprecise nature of the measurement, discrete measurements rather
than the continuous measurements represented on the diagram, are used.
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Psychologists have attempted to use attitude scales to measure many
intangible aspects of human behavior for some time. One of the critics
of the personality tests that have been used extensively in American in-
dustry is Martin L. Gross. (6) In his book 'The Brain Watchers," he is
critical not so much of the scales and tests themselves as he is of the
uses and unwarranted assumptions that are made by 'industrial psycholo-
gists 1 and others when they are using them. One of these untoward uses
occurs in attempting to adapt several existing tests for use in areas
where they were never intended to be used. It is felt that most of these
criticisms would not be valid for an attitude scale that was designed to
measure a single, well-defined issue and used only to measure attitude
relating to that issue.
Four Methods of Constructing Attitude Scales
There are four generally accepted methods of constructing attitude
scales: (1) the Method of Paired Comparisons; (2) the Method of Sum-
mated Ratings; (3) the Method of Equa 1 -Appear ing Intervals; and (k)
,
the Method of Successive Intervals. In the construction of a scale,
all four methods use the same initial steps. Individuals, singly and in
groups, are asked to write down and submit a statement or opinion con-
cerning the issue. In addition, a literature search is conducted to find
suitable, brief statements about the issue. The entire set of state-
ments and opinions is then edited to eliminate those that are irrele-
vant and those that do not relate directly to the issue. As an example
of the latter, suppose someone had submitted the statement, 'The con-
sumption of alcohol increases the desire for tobacco'. This may cer-
tainly be true, but it does not relate to his attitude toward prohibition
and it should not be included in the finished scale. What should remain
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after the editing is a rather extensive list of statements that is felt
to cover the entire continuum of attitudes toward the issue, from a posi-
tion of disagreement, through a neutral position, to a position of agree-
ment. It is important to ensure that there are neutral statements in-
cluded so that the scale will not break into two pieces. It is at this
point that the four methods separate but the underlying tenet for all of
them is that the measurement of attitude toward an issue by an individual
is effected by the endorsement or rejection of these statements or opin-
ions about that issue.
The Method of Paired Comparisons
This method attempts to define a frequency distribution by having a
number of persons compare each possible pair of statements and decide
which of the pair is most favorable toward the issue. The method as-
sumes that there is associated with each statement a most frequently
aroused response and that the responses to a given statement or stimulus
are normally distributed about the mean, or most frequently aroused res-
ponse. This mean is taken to be the scale value of the statement on the
attitude continuum. Thus a response S- to statement i is a normally
distributed random variable with mean Sj and standard deviation s^, and
S\- represents the scale value for the statement.
Let
f • • = the number of times statement i was judged more favorable
than statement j
,
N = the number of judges,
Pij = f ij/N >
and
z.-,- = the unit normal deviate expressing the value of Pj j
.
If, in the judging, it was found that statement i was judged more
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favorable than statement j, we would expect the scale value for state-
ment i, s". , to be higher than the scale value for statement j, S.-, where
the continuum of scale values runs from least favorable to most favor-
able. In order to determine the interval on the continuum that separ-
ates the scale values of statements i and j, it will be necessary to
examine the distribution of the difference between the two random
variables, Sj and S-. From basic statistics it is known that the dif-
ference between two normally-distributed random variables is also nor-
mally distributed with standard deviation
su . = (s? .* - 2r, J s i sjft (1)
where
s n- • = the standard deviation of the differences, S- - S.,i-j » i j»
s- and s. are standard deviations as previously defined,
and
r.. = the correlation between S- and S..
The scale separation between Sj and S- can be expressed in terms
of the above formula and the normal deviate z--, corresponding to the
proportion of comparative judgments, p.., in the following way:
~i
" ?j =z ij< s i + s j - 2r ij s i sj^ (*>S
If it is assumed that s- = s, for all i, and r.. = r for all i and j,
then
z.. = (S. - ?.)/(2s 2 (l - r))"\ (3)
The denominator of the right hand side of equation (3) is a constant and
is the common unit of measurement of the scale separations of the various
pairs of statements. Without any loss of generality, this constant may
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be set equal to 1.00 so that
If there are n statements, there are consequently
(£) = ni/2 • (n - 2) • = n(n-l)/2 (5)
equations of the form of equation (4) and n unknowns, allowing or favoring
a least squares solution to determine the scale separations. Next, a
matrix is constructed as follows:















z22 z 23 . . . z2n z2> z 2>
n I nz n3 nn n. n.
The z.'s are used for the actual scale values along the continuum of
values. The origin may be re-established by adding the absolute value
of the most negative z. to all the z. 's, permitting non-negative scale
values.
A problem arises with this method whenever an individual p.. turns
out to be equal to 1.00 or 0.00 because such a p.. does not provide any
estimate of the scale separation of S. and S..
1
J
It is considered wise to ignore not only comparative judgments for
which p.. is 1.00 or 0.00 but also those for which p.. is greater than
or equal to .98 and less than or equal to .02. (k) This is so because
the difference between the two z values is so much greater at the
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extremes of a normal distribution than the same difference near the mean.
Ignoring all p..'s greater than or equal to .98 and less than or
equal to .02 means that there will be 'holes' in the Z matrix. Now,











Because the origin on the continuum is arbitrary, we set S, =0, so
that s"
?
= D_.. It is then straightforward to solve for the remaining S^'s
so that the scale values are relative to the origin.
Not only does this method require many computations, but the number
of comparative judgments rises alarmingly as the number of statements
increases. Thurstone and Chave used 130 statements in their well-pub-
licized scale construction concerning attitudes toward the church (10).
Using the n(n-1 )/2equation as the resulting number of judgments to be
performed, 130 statements represent a required 8,385 comparative judg-
ments per judge 1
The Method of Summated Ratings
This method presumes that the statements can be accurately divided
into two classes, favorable and unfavorable. The subjects are then
directed to separate the statements into five categories; strongly dis-
agree, disagree, undecided, agree, strongly agree. An example of this
method is shown in the following table.
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TABLE I
The frequency and proportion of subjects falling into each of five
categories and the corresponding normal deviates.
STRONGLY STRONGLY
DISAGREE DISAGREE UNDECIDED AGREE AGREE
(1) f 26 86 42 26 20
(2) cf 26 112 154 180 200
(3) p .130 .430 .210 .130 .100
(4) cp .130 .450 .770 .900 1.000
(5) Midpoint cp .065 .345 .665 .835 .950
(6) z -1.514 - .399 .426 .974 1.645
(7) z + 1.514 .000 1.115 1.940 2.488 3.159
(8) z rounded 1 2 2 3
The line (1) entries are the frequencies with which the statement
was placed in each category and the entries of line (2) are the cumu-
lative frequencies. The line (3) entries are the proportions of clas-
sification in each category and those of line (4) are the cumulative
proportions. The line (5) entries are the midpoint cumulative propor-
tions, obtained by adding the proportion below that category and one-
half the proportion within that category. The line (6) entries are the
normal deviates from a table of the normal curve for the midpoint cp of
line (5) while line (7) is obtained by adding the absolute value of the
most negative entry of line (6) to all entries of that line. The entries
of line (8) are the values that are assigned to the various answers to
this particular statement and they are obtained by rounding off the line
(7) entries to the nearest integer.
The computations and the table shown above were done for a favor-
able statement. The methodology for an unfavorable statement is the
same except that the column headings would be reversed. In this way, a
'strongly agree' rating to an unfavorable statement would result in a zero
score, as would a 'strongly disagree' rating to a favorable statement.
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As the name of this method implies, a subject's score is a sum-
mation of the individual scores from all statements with the 'z rounded'
entries being used as the individual scores. Better separation of
scores may be obtained by rounding off to the nearest half rather than
to the nearest integer.
In this method, it is the subjects to be rated who actually deter-
mine the scale values to be used in the ratings, resulting in a 'relative
scale' for use within that group only. To use this method to measure
loyalty or allegiance in a counter insurgency situation, establishing a
different relative scale for each village would yield no useful results
because there would be no correlation between the scores of one village
and those of another village. If we were able to select a random sample
of villages from all parts of the country in question, however, and ob-
tain the necessary classifications of our statements from them, the re-
sulting scale could be of more value for classifying villages throughout
the country than one of the other methods that uses judges who may not
be directly connected with the area. It would be very interesting to
see what the correlation would be between a scale obtained from villagers
and one from a group of judges, using the same statements.
A relative scale obtained from the people of the country in which
we are interested would require a truly random selection of villages to
be used for the scale construction. Numerous methods for obtaining
random selections are in use by Gallup and the various pollsters in this
country and their basic principles could be used in obtaining a random
selection of villages, even though variations in details may be necessary
from country to country.
ko
The Method of Equal -Appear ing Intervals
This method is the one Thurstone and Chave used when they attempted
to measure attitudes toward the church (10). After they had gathered
130 statements and opinions, they had them mimeographed, one to a page,
and gave a set of them to each of 3^5 judges. The judges were then in-
structed to separate the statements into eleven categories, labeled A
through K, where A denotes those statements which, in the opinion of that
judge, express the highest appreciation of the issue. F denotes those
of a neutral character and K denotes those statements having the highest
depreciation of the issue while the categories between A - F and F - K
are gradings of the appreciation of the issue. Numerically grading the
categories with A = 0-1, B = 1-2, . . . F = 5-6, . . . K = 10-11, the
cumulative frequencies for each category were tabulated.
In this method, the 50th percentile is considered the scale value
and the distance between the 75th and 25th percentiles is called the
0_-value for that statement. Statements with large Q_-va1ues are dis-
carded as being ambiguous and the remaining statements are considered
acceptable as an attitude scale.
Each person whose attitudes were measured was asked to mark those
statements which he thought were in accord with the issue. In compiling
the score, the mean value for each interval was used rather than the
exact numerical score previously computed for each statement, i. e.,
1.5 was assigned to each statement falling within the first usable
interval, 2.5 for the next and so forth, up to 9.5 for the last usable
interval. As a test case, college students were tested as to their
attitudes toward the church. The results were reasonable, with the
divinity students having the group score indicating the most favorable
k]
attitude toward the church.
The reliability of the scale was checked by dividing the scale into
two halves and having groups test on each half separately. The state-
ments were ranked in ascending scale value and divided into pairs. The
first statement from each of the odd-numbered pairs were put into group
A and the first statement from each of the even-numbered pairs were put
into group B so that the final score from each group should be approxi-
mately the same. Thurstone found the correlation between his sets of
scores to be .848 and, using the Spear man- Brown formula,
"the estimated reliability of the whole scale is 0.92, which
is quite satisfactory." (10)
After his check for reliability, Thurstone then went on to test
for ambiguity and irrelevance of the statements. (10) These procedures
are a necessity in producing an attitude scale and should be used in
any actual construction of such a scale.
It is evident that in this method there is no check on the basic
assumption that the intervals into which the statements are sorted are,
in fact, equal. When the same statements are scaled by the Method of
Paired Comparisons and the Method of Equal -Appearing Intervals, Hevner
showed that the relationship is approximately linear except at the ex-
treme ends of the scales. (9) This study indicated that when a state-
ment has an extreme value on t>he continuum, as established by the Method
of Paired Comparisons, its corresponding value on the Equa 1 -Appear ing
Interval continuum will be less extreme, i.e., it will be closer toward
the center of that continuum. In considering this problem, Attneave
concluded that:
"The source of this distortion is fairly evident on a priori 1
grounds. The ratings of a given item by a number of judges will,
when unrestricted^ tend to distribute themselves normally about
the hypothetical ly 'true 1 rating? but when the 'true' rating
k2
falls at an extreme, variability is possible in only one direction.
The distribution obtained in the latter case will therefore be
skewed away from the end of the scale, yielding a mean (or median)
too close to the center." (13)
The reason for this distortion is also evident if we look at the statis-
tics being used. Statistically speaking the method is making a normal
approximation to the binomial distribution and it is well known that
this approximation does not yield good results at the extremes of the
distribution.
The Equal -Appearing Interval scaling does not require the judges to
discriminate between statements placed in the same category. If, early
in his judging, a judge finds a statement which he regards as very un-
favorable, he will place it in the most extreme category. If he later
finds another statement that he regards as even more unfavorable than
the first, however, it nevertheless goes into the same category because
he is not required to discriminate between individual statements. Thus,
if many statements have scale values that are close together, at one
extreme of the Equa 1 -Appear ing Interval continuum, the scale values would
show a much greater spread if they were determined by a method which
forces discrimination between them.
The Method of Successive Intervals
This method was designed to eliminate the major assumption of the
Equal -Appearing Interval Method, namely, the assumption that the inter-
vals are in fact equal. Rather than assume an interval width, the
Method of Successive Intervals determines the widths and the scale
values via definite computational procedures. The sorting or judging
of the statements is done in the same manner as it is done in the
Equa 1 -Appear ing Interval Method. Entries like those in Table II would
be made for all statements which were judged, where
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f is the frequency with which the given statement was placed
in each category,
cf is the cumulative frequency for the particular statement,
and
cp is the cumulative proportion for that statement in each
category.
TABLE II
Frequencies, cumulative frequencies, and cumulative proportions for
each statement in an arrangement of interval width data.
SUCCESSIVE INTERVALS
STATEMENTS Unfavorable Neutral Favorable
f 2 i+ 12 12 26 52 60 26 6
1 cf 2 6 18 30 56 108 168 194 200
cp .010 .030 .090 .150 .280 .540 .840 .970 1.000
f 2 4 20 88 Ik 12
2 cf 2 6 26 114 188 200
cp .000 .000 .000 .010 .030 .130 .570 .9^0 1.000
f 2 12 32 28 36 52 24 10 4
3 cf 2 14 46 74 110 162 186 196 200
cp .010 .070 .230 .370 .550 .810 .930 .980 1.000
f 8 18 32 34 50 28 20 4 6
4 cf 8 26 58 92 142 170 190 194 200
cp .040 .130 .290 .460 .710 .850 .950 .970 1.000
f 4 24 36 38 14 32 24 20 8
5 cf 4 28 64 102 116 148 172 192 200
cp .020 .140 .320 .510 .580 .740 .860 .960 1.000
We assume that the proportion distributions are normal when pro-
jected on the unknown continuum, and define the scale values of the
statements to be the means of these normal distributions. We will be
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able to find the normal deviates corresponding to the boundaries of the
successive intervals for each statement by entering the table of the nor.
mal curve with the cumulative proportions (cp) of Table II. When corn-
pi led in a table, these normal deviates appear as in Table III.
TABLE III
Normal deviates z-« corresponding to the upper limits of the succes-




1 -1.881 -1.341 -1.036 - .583 .100 .99*+ 1.881
2 -1.881 -1.126 .176 1.555
3 -1.476 - .739 - .332 .126 .878 1.1+76 2.05*+
4 -1.751 -1.126 - .553 - .100 .553 1 .036 1 .645 1.881
5 -2.054 -1.080 - .468 .025 .202 .643 1 .080 1.751
Now, by considering the entries in a single row, we may arrive at an
estimate of the interval widths on the continuum. If we let w. . be the
interval widths, where
w. . = 2. . - z. / . , x, (8)
ij ij HJ-D
we will form another table of estimates of the interval widths (Table IV)
Since the w. . for which i is constant and i takes on all values are esti-
mates of the widths of the same interval, we will assume that the best
estimates are the arithmetic means of the column entries in Table IV.
* Tables (3) through (5) are reproduced from Edwards' "Techniques of
Attitude Scale Construction" except that only the first five of his set
of fourteen statements are used here. (4)
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TABLE IV
Estimates of interval widths w.j • obtained from the differences
between the upper limits of the intervals as shown in Table III
SUCCESSIVE INTERVALS
STATEMENTS 2 - 1 3 - 2 4 - 3 5 - 4 6 - 5 7 - 6 8 - 7
1 .540 .305 .453 .683 .894 .887
2 .755 1.302 1.379
3 .737 .407 .458 .752 .598 .578
4 .625 .573 .453 .653 .483 .609 .236
5 .974 .612 .493 .177 .441 .437 .671
(1) Sum 1.599 2.462 1.658 1.741 3.114 3.840 3.751
(2) n 2 4 4 4 5 5 5
(3) w •
•J
.800 .616 .414 .435 .623 .768 .750
(4) Cum. w .
-J
.800 1.416 1.830 2.265 2.888 3.656 4.406
The sums of line (1) are the column sums and the n's of line (2) are
the numbers of terms in each column. The w -'s of line (3) are the arith-
•J
metic means of the terms in the columns and the line (4) entries are the
cumulative arithmetic means. The line (4) entries are further taken to
be the cumulative interval widths on the attitude continuum.
To compute the scale values for the statements, we use the formula
S. = L + ((.50 - P b )/pw )w . . (9)
where
S. = the scale value of the ith statement,
L = the lower limit of the interval on the continuum in which the
median fal Is,
p = the sum of the proportions below the interval in which the
median fal Is,
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pw = the proportion within the interval in which the median falls,
and
w = the width of the interval on the continuum.
•J
To find the scale value for the first statement, we look in Table II
and see that the median falls in the 6-5 interval, the median being the
cumulative proportion of .500. The lower limit of the 6-5 interval is
the "Cum. w . entry of the preceding interval from Table IV, so that
•J
for the first statement, L = 2.265. The p. value is found from Table II
under successive interval 5 or a value of .280. The p value is therw
difference between successive interval 6 entry minus the successive inter-
val 5 entry from Table II. Therefore, using w . entry from Table IV (row
•J
(3) under Successive Interval 6-5),
S. = 2.265 + ((.50 - .28)/(.54 - .28)) (.623) = 2.792.
The scale values for the other statements may be found in a similar manner.
The Method of Successive Intervals does not allow us to estimate the
interval widths for either of the two extreme intervals. If we have x
successive intervals, we are able to compute widths for only x-2 of them.
Edwards recommends using enough successive intervals so that the possibi-
lity of any statement having more than 50% of its judgments falling in an
extreme interval is small.
There is a method of estimating the widths of the extreme intervals
in the event that more than 50% of the judgments for one or more statements
fall into an extreme interval. Initially, all statements with a proportion
of judgments of ,0k or more in the first interval are to be used when esti-
mating those with more than 50% in the first interval. An estimate of the
midpoint of the first interval is one-half the proportion of judgments
falling below the upper limit of the first interval. The normal deviates
<+7
for the midpoint and the upper limit of the first interval are found and
the differences for each statement are computed. The arithmetic mean of
the sum of these differences will then be the estimate of the width be-
tween the midpoint and the upper limit of the first interval when pro-
jected on the continuum. What is done, in essence, is to shift the
origin of the continuum from the upper limit of the first interval to
the midpoint of that interval. There is still no lower bound for the
first interval so that we cannot find the true width of the entire
interval. Table V shows what is done to estimate the half-width of the
first interval, which is necessary because statement 4 has more than 50%
of its judgments falling in the first interval.
TABLE V
Proportions falling below the midpoint and upper limit of the first
interval and normal deviates corresponding to the proportions for seven
statements.
PROPORTION
STATEMENTS FALLING BELOW NORMAL DEVIATE DIFFERENCE
Midpoint Upper Limit Midpoint Upper Limit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (4) - (3)
1 .100 .200 -1.282 - .842 .440
2 .150 .300 -1.036 - .524 .512
3 .020
4 .280 .560 - .583 .151 .734
5 .020 .040 -2.054 -1.751 .303
6 .075 .150 -1.440 -1.036 .404
7 .040 .080 -1.751 -1.405 .346
SUM 2.739
Statement 3 was not used in the computation because there were less
than 4% of its judgments falling in the first interval, a criterion that
was used previously to eliminate the use of extreme values. The esti-
mated width from the midpoint to the upper limit of the first interval
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is equal to the sum, divided by the number of statements used in the
computations, or, 2.739/6 = .^56. The scale value of the fourth state-
ment is computed as before, using
and
w • = M6,
•J




where .28 is the proportion of judgments falling between the midpoint
and the upper limit and is also the proportion falling below the mis-
point. Therefore, with L = 0,
Sk = ((.50 - .28)/. 28) (M6) = .358.
If more than 50% of the judgments for any one statement fall in the
last interval, a method similar to the one just described for the first
interval would have to be used because there is no upper limit which we
can use to estimate the width of the last interval.
To find each midpoint, we take the proportion of judgments falling
below the last interval, subtract it from one, and divide that result by
two. Next, we find the normal deviates for this lower limit and the mid-
point, find the difference between these values and sum all such differ-
ences. Dividing this sum by the number of statements used will yield
the estimate of the width on the continuum from the lower limit to the
midpoint of the last interval. As before, a statement is not used if
the difference between the lower limit and unity is less than .0A. The
scale value is computed as before.
This is briefly the method of successive intervals. There are
checks for internal consistency, ambiguity and so forth, which are des-
cribed in Edwards, (k)
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Attitude Scales and Counter i nsurgency Operations
Of the four methods presented here, the Method of Summated Ratings
appears to be best for the development of a measure of effectiveness for
counterinsurgency operations, if we are able to obtain the answers we
need to construct the relative scale from the people of the country in
which we are interested. It is felt that this type of scale, based on
responses of the people of a particular country, would be better able to
measure the attitudes of other people of that country.
If the general tone of loyalty and allegiance begins to change
throughout the country, it will be necessary to construct another rela-
tive scale so that the periodic measuring of attitudes will have some
relation, to the scale values being used.
In the event it becomes impractical to implement the Method of
Summated Ratings, the Method of Successive Intervals appears to be the
next most preferred method because: (1) the Paired Comparison Method
requires excessive numbers of judgments and excessive computational effort
and (2), the Equa 1 -Appear ing Interval Method lacks the precision that the
Successive Interval Method may have in the extreme intervals.
With this methodology available to construct an attitude scale for
the measurement of allegiance in counterinsurgency operations, one might
ask just what kinds of statements should be used in the construction and
from whom the opinions should be obtained. For example, it would seem
reasonable that those best qualified to know about the villagers of
Southeast Asia are selected villagers from Souteast Asia. One possible
way to proceed with the construction of an attitude scale would be to
gain access to a group of villagers whom we could persuade to write out
their opinions about the government. If this were not possible, we
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should go to those persons who know most about the subjects and issues
in which we are interested. Missionaries who have worked in the country
seem to be a good source of information, as would anthropologists fami-
liar with the country and its people. Experimental psychologists and
other behavioral scientists might be helpful because of their experience
with constructing attitude scales. Former civic action officers and ad-
visors, and perhaps even diplomats to the area in question would know
the people well enough to assist in developing a set of statements and
opinions. It may be profitable to have persons of one type of back-
ground sort or judge the statements developed by persons with a different
background.
The following chapter discusses just what we want to measure and
what we should expect these measurements to show us. There is also dis-
cussion of what types of questions or statements might be used and the
areas they should cover.
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VI. INDICATORS OF POPULAR SUPPORT
Al legiance
The concept of al legiance, lbyalty, or patriotism is not interpreted
in the same way in each country and at each point in time. It would,
for example, be extremely difficult to measure the government allegiance
of the inhabitants of a transitional country using measures relevant to
patriotism in the United States. It might be more appropriate to attempt
to measure the people's willingness to be controlled by their government
or their willingness to cooperate with their government, to heed govern-
ment advice, and to accept governmental programs. It is probably true
that the majority of the people of the United States would be more willing
to sell their merchandise to the U. S. government even though the Iron
Curtain countries offered a higher price. It should not be expected, how-
ever, that the people of South Vietnam, would not sell their rice to the
Viet Cong if the price differential were much higher.
In attempting to capture the "hearts and minds" of the people whose
country is torn by an insurgency, we must be realistic as to the extent
to which this is possible. It is quite possible that our Western concept
of allegiance will have to be altered during the initial phases of a
counterinsurgency and that we should be initially satisfied with some-
thing less than complete "Western allegiance" from the people. We would
hope that as time passed and as the insurgents' influence among the popu-
lace abated, the people would begin to identify with their government and
that an attitude of allegiance as we know it would begin to develop.
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Indicators To Be Measured
There have been several attempts to list the indicators of popular
support that comprise the overall control of the people by the insurgent
or counterinsurgent but S. N. Bjelajac has probably compiled the most
extensive and detailed list. (2) He lists eleven "interactive guidelines",
the measures of which collectively represent a comprehensive measurement
of the overall degree of control enjoyed by the insurgent or counterin-
surgent. Nine of these guidelines are discussed below, along with some
sample questions which give some idea of the type that could be used in
a questionnaire designed to measure the allegiance of the people of an
insurgent-torn country. A more extensive list of questions is contained
in Appendix C . The remaining two guidelines are concerned with measures
of security and it will not be discussed here.
In the following discussion of the guidelines, all quotations are
taken from Bjelajac's report unless otherwise stated. It is felt that
no reliability will be lost by using statements to construct the atti-
tude scale and then converting the statements to questions for use in
the questionnaire.
Political Control
'The degree of political control exercised over the administrative
subdivisions of a given area can be measured in terms of control
of the many individual institutions through which political and
governmental activities are manifested."
To make this questionnaire one which the individual villager can
answer, it will be necessary to avoid questions of a general nature.
While support of the government's counter i nsurgency programs by the
village council or elders is important, it is not a measure of this
acceptance by the individual villager. Examples of questions directed
at the individual might by, 'If you were offered a position of responsi-
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bility in the village, would you unhesitatingly accept? 1 , and, 'Would you
be willing to serve on the police force of your village? 1
It is seen that rather than being measures of loyalty, these ques-
tions could be considered as being merely a test of whether or not the
villager believes that government security is effective for that area
and is likely to continue so. It is felt, however, that these questions
will have merit in their proposed task, especially when considered with
the remainder of the questions in the questionnaire.
Control of Intelligence
"The pattern of the flow of intelligence is an excellent general
barometer of progress in insurgency/counter insurgency. The details
of this pattern must be analyzed systematically, for the conclusions
to be drawn vary widely with such factors as the quantity and qua-
lity of intelligence, its subject orientation, its method of acqui-
sition, and its sources."
Because the source of intelligence is a significant indicator of
progress, (i.e., information voluntered by the people indicates a willing-
ness to support the government), we may ask, 'If you knew of something
the Viet Cong were doing or were planning to do that was detrimental to
the South Vietnamese forces, would you report it to a government official? 1
Also significant is the type of information that is volunteered.
We would expect that someone who is completely pro-government would
volunteer all types of information about Viet Cong activities and in
particular, information concerning the clandestine operations within and
near the village. A question might be, 'If you knew that a member of
your village or someone living within your village were working for the
Viet Cong, would you report him to the government?'
The scope of government intelligence coverage is also important but
perhaps a little less easy to grasp for our purposes. Data on the endu-
rance of government intelligence nets and the coverage within disputed
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and enemy controlled areas may well have to be garnered by evaluation
and opinion of the area advisor as is currently the case in Vietnam.
A measure of the scope of intelligence might be the willingness of the
villagers to risk reporting minor as well as major insurgent plans.
It is conceivable that a villager would risk Viet Cong reprisal to report
known plans of major Viet Cong activity but that they would be reluctant
to risk themselves to report plans of minor activities.
Public Opinion and Propaganda
"Popular allegiance and support - not geographic areas under control
are the ultimate measures of success for either side.
"When attitudes need to be changed, the professional propagandist
normally bases hip appeals both on sentiment and logic. Each of
these are in themselves composed of many factors. Either may pre-
dominate; however, more often appeals to sentiment carry the greater
weight."
While
'There are several approaches to estimating the extent to which the
insurgents or the counter insurgents are successful in disseminating
their information policies and the degree to which these dissemina-
tions appear to influence public opinion,"
many are of the type that cannot be investigated by questioning or polling
individuals. The extent to which the press and other public media con-
tribute voluntary government support and the amount of influence the gov-
ernment is able to exert over non-governmental public and private organ-
izations are examples. Individual responses to the use of government-
oriented news and propaganda media could be useful, as well as the atten-
dance at pro-government meetings and rallies.
Political Aspects of Education
"The term political aspects of education is, for the sake of this
discussion, intended to embrace those aspects of ideological
indoctrination carried out within the institutional framework of
the public educational system."
Again, there are many areas of general concern that may not be
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measureable by individual responses, such as the number of schools active
within the system, the overall attendance rate, the competence of the
teachers, etc.
The willingness of the people to send their children to the schools;
the alacrity of the individual to aid in the re-establishment of the
school system in the event of military, guerrilla, or terrorist disruption;
the degree of support for a pro-government teacher are all indicators of
the pro-government leanings we are seeking.
Control of the Legal System
There must be
"...respect for the courts, laws, and other legal instruments of
government by the public, as opposed to acquiescence to insurgent
attempts to establish their own shadow government."
This may be measured in part by the willingness of the people to
resolve any legal disputes they may have through the village, district,
or province legal processes.
As in so many areas dealing with human emotions and opinions, it is
not necessarily what the situation actually is that matters, but rather
it is what the people think the situation to be that is of prime impor-
tance. In other words, no matter how effective the government law en-
forcement agencies, unless the people believe they are being protected
and that the police are not unduly harsh and unfair, we are not being
successful in our attempts to alter public opinion from pro-insurgent to
pro-counter i nsurgent. Therefore, the questions for our questionnaire
should probably be like the following:
a. Do you believe government supporters and sympathizers are
adequately protected?
b. Do you believe the government laws are fair and just for all
people?
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c. If you had a dispute with your neighbor, would you go to the
police and government courts for settlement?
d. Do you agree with the government policy of severe punishment
for those convicted of political, economic, or other crimes
against the security of the country?
Also important is the trend of opinion over time; the changing of
public opinion from ant i -government to pro-government. Trend analysis
questions should probably be incorporated into each of the "interactive
guidelines" when the actual questionnaire is developed.
Community Services and Civic Action
"The question of who effectively controls civic functions in an
area and thereby plays the role of social reformer is in itself
one indicator of the trend of political control within the area.
Each area must, of course, be evaluated in the light of its actual
political, psychological, and military situation, taking into
account the fact that some areas are of greater strategic import-
ance than others. Political trends within the country as a whole
may be derived from a careful and weighted analysis of such trends
within individual areas."
We cannot say that the mere doing of what we feel the people need
will constitute an adequate civic action program. Here again, it is of
paramount importance to consider not what the facts actually are, but
what the people think they are. An extensive post-high school educa-
tional system might be of long-range importance but the people of Vietnam
may not favor it, since a fourth grade education is considered the ulti-
mate at this time. Questions, therefore, might pertain to opinions as
to whom is responsible for the maintenance of community services.
In Vietnam, the Revolutionary Development Teams feel they have
achieved some measure of success by the fact that the Viet Cong keep
harassing them and attacking villages where the Teams have been or are
active. It is felt that repeated attacks by the insurgents on any
government program may be taken as an indication of the success of that
program. A village's willingness to help rebuild the accomplishments
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of the program after an insurgent attack would seem to reflect his belief
in the program and in the sponsor of the program.
Control of Transportation and Communications
The control of transportation and communications is generally a
larger and more general type measurement and is not directly relatable
to the individual villagers. A villager might be asked about his trepi-
dation, or lack of it, in traveling the public roads of the country.
Also, his willingness to work in or become part of a government warning
net or system would be a plus for the government.
As with other categories, the voluntary reporting of insurgent
activities to the government forces and his willingness to do so is
indicative of government progress in the area.
Control of Recruitment
The ability to gain voluntary recruits is obviously a plus factor
for either side. A negative indicator, on the other hand, is the neces-
sity to use political controls or other coercive forms of persuasion or
social pressures to gain the necessary recruits. The positive involve-
ment of a potential recruit's family is also considered a plus factor.
Therefore one may pose questions on the willingness of the father to
allow his son to enlist or become part of the government forces. A
negative indicator would be the willingness of the villager to become
or allow his dependents to become members of the insurgent infrastructure.
Economic Controls
The ease of collecting taxes from the populace is a measure of pro-
government attitudes, while increasing difficulty in tax collection be-
comes a measure of increasing pro-insurgent feelings. We might ask




'Do you think you should pay taxes to the Viet Cong?'
'Do the Viet Cong take their taxes by force?'
Without a strong sense of allegiance to the government, which seems
lacking at this stage of progress in Vietnam, it is reasonable to expect
a villager to sell his produce to the highest bidder in an open market.
Thus, one question might askj
'Given equal prices, would you rather sell your goods to the Viet
Cong or to the government?'
Administration of The Questionnaire
It may be thought that a measure of effectiveness that was directly
concerned with the people could be incorporated into a month by month,
hamlet by hamlet evaluation and would be truly reflective of the true
state of general feeling toward or against the government. The possibi-
lity that the people will recognize what answers the questioners would
like to hear and will answer accordingly does exist, however. The pos-
sibility that they will learn the questionnaire if it is repeated too
often and that the answer will thenceforth lose meaning is also present.
The first problem could conceivably be overcome by the judicious choosing
of questions that should have the same answer even though the questions
are of different forms. This is sometimes called a lie scale, which is
imbedded within the questionnaire and serves to give some measure of the
reliability of answers to the analyst.
The second problem could present difficulty. It is possible that
for a measure of effectiveness to be at all useful, it must be used only
about once a quarter or less. If it is found that the Hamlet Evaluation
System currently in use appears to be giving fairly good results, then
the questionnaire developed could be used as a more accurate measure of
the feelings of the populace. It might be used to point up weaknesses
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in the other measures of effectiveness and cause alteration in their
makeup.
It would seem that the Hamlet Evaluation System would be useful on a
monthly basis and that the system proposed here would be of value in pin-
pointing trouble areas within a hamlet or village and in describing more
fully just what the popular opinion really is. This could be done quar-
terly, to offset the learning of the questionnaire, and in conjunction
with the Hamlet Evaluation System should result in a fairly accurate idea
of how we stand in a country besieged by insurgents.
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VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
'Winning the hearts and minds of the people 1 is a very tired cliche
but represents a task that must be accomplished. The people of the
country engaged in an insurgency should be the object of our efforts and
strategies. We should be primarily interested in separating the people
from the insurgent's influence and in protecting them from the terrorist
and oppressive activities of the insurgent guerrillas.
With an objective of this kind, it is quite obvious that it will be
extremely difficult to find a measure of effectiveness that actually re-
flects progress in the attainment of our objective, the winning over of
the people, and is at the same time quantitatively measureable.
It would be desirable to find several indicators that we knew were
indicative of the attitudes of the people and to watch these over time.
Indicators being used by two agencies in Vietnam today are generally re-
lated to things we believe should happen if the people are in fact being
persuaded to follow the government line. In addition, most of the scoring
for these indicators is done by U.S. military personnel without going
directly to the people to discover their feelings.
It is felt that the present systems need at least a complementary
system that will measure the feelings of the people. Several methods
used by psychologists to measure attitudes and human intangibles seem to
have value for our purposes. Of the four methods discussed, the Method
of Summated Ratings appears to have the most value for us. Its value
depends upon our ability to use information from a random sample of
villages from the country in which we are interested to construct a
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'relative scale' for use throughout the country. If this is not possbi 1e,
the Method of Successive Intervals seems to be applicable for our purpose.
The questions or statements to be used in this questionnaire should
be related to what the villagers think the situation in his country is
and what he thinks it should be. In the event there are no persons fami-
liar with the country to write out the opinions and statements for use in
the construction, it is felt that psychologists, anthropologists, etc.
might be utilized for this task.
If it is felt that since such a questionnaire is liable to learning
by the villagers, it could be used strictly as a complementary system
with those in use now, possibly on a quarterly or semi-annually basis.
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APPENDIX A
REPORT OF PACIFICATION PROGRESS
PART I - INSTRUCTION
1. There are basically five objectives which have to be accomplished
before an area can properly be rated as pacified:
(a) All organized Communist military forces must be driven out of
the area or destroyed, and the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN)
and/or the Regional Forces must have developed the capability to destroy
organized Communist forces locally.
(b) The Communist infrastructure must be detected and destroyed
and steps taken to prevent its restoration.
(c) Government of Vietnam local security plans and forces must be
established for protection against small unit and guerrilla attacks.
(d) Loyal village and hamlet governments must be established and
f unctioni ng.
(e) Minimum new life development programs must be completed.
2. In determining the method to be used in evaluating pacification
progress, the following principles have been utilized.
(a) Each of the foregoing objectives are of equal importance.
(b) There are certain specific, relatively easily ascertainable
manifestations or progress toward the attainment of each of the above
objectives which should be recognized as they are accomplished.
(c) Progress toward the accomplishment of each of the above
objectives may be made simultaneously, so that it is not necessary to
have accomplished all of the objectives in one category before progress
can be recorded in one of the other categories.
3. The following instructions should be adhered to in completing part II
of this report:
(a) TAOR . This will be either "Phu Bai," "Danang" or "Chu Lai."
(b) Area No . Each village within each TAOR will be assigned an
Area No. by the appropriate Civic Action Coordinator assigned pursuant
to reference (a) no later than 25 March 1966 and this designator will
be permanent, (in the Danang TAOR, the City of Danang is hereby assigned
as "Area No. 1" and Mao Lang Village, Moa Vang District is assigned as
"Area No. 2." The Commanding General, 3d Marine Division, will assign
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all other Area Numbers within this TAOR.) The appropriate "Area No."
for the village being evaluated will then always be entered.
(c) Vi 1 lage and District
. Enter the name of the village and the
district being evaluated.
(d) Date. Since each evaluation is to be made as of the 28th day
of each month, enter here "28" and the appropriate month.
(e) General Instruction on Entering Evaluations .
(1) The maximum points attributable for the accomplishment of
each objective is set forth in the column headed "Max. Pts." When the
stated objective has been fully accomplished, enter that maximum figure;
pending full accomplishment, enter that proportion of the maximum points
which correctly reflects the percentage of the particular objective
which has been accomplished. For example, under Objective III C
({'Permanent Local Defense Forces Trained and In Place"), if only one-half
of the local defense forces have been trained and are in place, enter the
figure "6" opposite the maximum points of "12."
(2) It is possible that there will be periods when there will
be a regression rather than progress toward the accomplishment of a
specific objective. For example, again under Objective III C, perhaps
on 28 April, 50% of the forces were trained and in place, so that the
figure "6" would have been entered; on 28 May, however, for one reason
or another, only 25% are still trained and in place, for May, then, the
figure "3" would be entered.
(f
)
PARA I - Destruction of Organized Viet Cong Military Forces .
Item "A" is self-explanatory, Item "B" has reference to Government of
Vietnam forces sufficient to keep out organized Communist military forces
as distinguished from Communist guerr i 1 la forces . Reference has to be
made to Regional Forces and RVN forces, as distinguished from local de-
fense forces such as Popular Forces and Combat Youth Teams in making this
evaluation.
(g) PARA II - Destruction of Viet Cong Infrastructure . Items "A"
through "D" are self-explanatory and can be determined from local offi-
cials on the scene. Item "E" consists of information which passes
directly from the Census Grievance Teams to the Province Chiefs. It will
therefore be necessary to monitor progress on this objective through
Liaison Officers at provincial levels.
(h) Establishment of Local Security . The objectives set forth
under this category must be evaluated not only with reference to the
village as a whole, but with reference to Objective III D, ("Communica-
tions Established With Military Supporting Unit"). Before this objec-
tive can be classified as having been accomplished, each Hamlet Chief
or the Commanding Officer of the hamlet local security forces, must have
radio communication with a supporting military unit so that he can call
in artillery support or for reserve forces in the event of an attack upon
his hamlet.
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(i) Establishment of Local Governments . The objectives set forth
in this category are self-explanatory. Objective IV-I ("Social and Admin-
istration Organization of Villagers") must reflect the opinion of the
Village Chief and the judgment of the local USMC Civil Affairs Officer.
(j) PARA V - Completion of Initial New Life Hamlet Programs . All
of the objectives set forth under this category necessarily reflect the
conclusions of the Village and Hamlet Chiefs together with the conclusions
of the USMC Civil Affairs Officer responsible for Civic action activities
withi n the vi 1 lage.
(k) PARA VI - Summary . Enter in this portion of the report the
total of all five categories of objectives in order to determine a quan-
tified evaluation of pacification progress within the village.
(1) COMMENTS . Under this portion of the report, enter a con-
cise explanation of each of the quantified evaluations of the various
objectives listed above, highlighting goals, problems and significant
developments in connection with each.
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WORK SHEET - PACIFICATION PROGRESS DETERMINATION
TAOR
Area No. Village
D i s t r i ct
Task Max.Pts Pts
I . Destruction of organized V.C. military forces 20
A. V.C, local main force units destroyed or
driven out 15
B. GVN military forces capable of defending
area 5
Total points 20
II. Destruction of V.C. infrastructure 20
A. Census completed and analyzed 2
B. V.C. infrastructure discovered, destroyed
or neutralized 8
C. GVN intelligence network established 5
D. Census grievance teams completed
interviewing each family 2
E. Principal grievances have been completely
processed 3
Total points 20
III. Establishment of Local Security 20
A. Defense plans completed 2
B. Defense construction completed 3
C. Permanent local defense forces trained
and in place 12




IV. Establishment of Local Governments 20
A. Village chief and council appointed
and functioning 2
B. Village chief and council elected 2
C. Village chief lives in village and is
able to sleep therein 3
D. Hamlet chiefs and councils appointed
and functioning 2
E. Hamlet chiefs and counci Is elected 2
F. Hamlet chiefs live in hamlets and are
able to sleep therein 4
G. Permanent psy ops and public information
services established 3
H. Village statutes enacted 1
I. Social and administrative organization
of villages completed to meet immediate
needs of villagers 1
Total points 20
V. Completion of Initial New Life Hamlet Programs • 20
A. Necessary public health works have been
completed to meet initial needs of
villagers k
B. Necessary educational requirements have been
met to meet initial needs of villagers k
C. Necessary agricultural works have been
completed to meet initial needs of
vi 1 lagers k
D. Necessary markets have been established k
E. Adequate ground transportation established




A. Destruction of organized V.C. military
forces 20
B. Destruction of V.C. infrastructure 20
C. Establishment of local security 20
D. Establishment of local government 20








DIRECTION FOR COMPLETING HAMLET EVALUATION WORKSHEET : Fill out this form
for each hamlet except those in the category of V.C. control. The total
number of hamlets under V.C. control should be forwarded as part of your
remarks.
1. Identify the hamlet as indicated. The hamlet number is that
assigned to the hamlet by the GVN. Type of hamlet refers to Ap Doi Moi
,
Ap Tan Sinh, Cung Co, Ap Xay Dung, or Ap Binh Dinh.
2. Enter the rating given the hamlet under the present evaluation
system i.e., Secured, Undergoing Securing, Undergoing Clearing, or
Uncontested.
3. The left hand column of the form lists six subject categories,
each with three subdi vidions. The columns headed E through A are graded
to represent conditions ranging from formerly V.C. Controlled hamlets in
which GVN influence is just beginning (E) through stages of increasing
GVN influence and activity to the hamlet that is completely secure and in
which nation building programs are well underway (A). The items given
are intended to suggest steps in progress from E to A, not to describe
them fully. Signs of progress indicated at one step should be understood
as continuing in the succeeding steps. Items refer to the hamlet itself
unless otherwise indicated.
k. Check one box for each of the eighteen subcategories, selecting
the grade (E through A) that best fits the conditions relating to each
subcategory in the hamlet being evaluated, for that month. For example,
you may rate subcategory 1-b as C and subcategory 4-b as E, if the threat
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of action by V.C. units from outside the hamlet is no longer immediate
but an RD Cadre Team or some other GVN presence has not yet been committed
(5) Check the appropriate boxes: During the month the hamlet was
visited by the evaluator , by a member of his staff , by some other
US district team member ; by the evaluator 's RVN counterpart
.
(6) After completing your evaluation of the hamlet, select one of
the following five numbers which best represents your estimate, for each
of the six criteria, of the confidence you have in the validity of the
available information upon which your eighteen ratings were based:
(1) No confidence; (2) Low confidence; (3) Medium confidence; (k) High
confidence; (5) Complete confidence. Enter these numbers in the boxes
labeled confidence estimate.
FOUO




District Village Hamlet Name Hamlet No. Type of Hamlet
Uncontested_ Undergoing C1earing_ Undergoing Securing Secured NPA__12 3^56
Confidence
Estimate
I, VC Military Activities Vi 1 Gs combat effective tho some
a. Vi
1
lage Guerr i 1 la Unit identified or eliminated; VC Vi
1
defenses largely intact. _E_
Vi1 Gs reduced somewhat in men &
defenses; can attack in plat
strength from within village or
near area (10-15 km) _D_
Military control of Vi 1 broken,
most Gs identified, 50% losses,
havens destroyed, activity below
plat level; can harass but not
prevent GVN activities in hamlet _C_
Vi 1 G control reduced to 1-2 ham-
lets on Vi 1 periphery; could make
desperation raid. Activities of Gs
from adjacent Vils limited by no
havens or friendly defenses. _B_
Vi 1 G remnants driven out. No threat
of harassment or intimidation from Gs
in adjacent Vils. A
b. External Forces (EF) EF intact; may have base & can make
(Prov. Main Force, company-sized attacks within 15 km
unit in district) of hamlet. Hamlet or Vil may have
been fired on and/or assaulted
during month. E
Unit in district reduced up to 25%;
EF otherwise as in E. _D_
Unit in district reduced up to 50%
in men & arms, or bases near hamlet
destroyed. No VC operations company-
size or larger, no mortar or RR fire




1. c. Military Incidents
Effecting Hamlet
Bases in district or near hamlet
destroyed; unit in district only
marginally effective. Not capable
of company-size operations. B
Unit in district eliminated or
ineffective; no attacks by plat or
larger & no mortar or RR fire in
district or near hamlet. Attack
possible only from outside district. A
Armed VC units in hamlet at night,
sometimes in day. Little GVN
authority at night. Routes to hamlet
interdicted by day; may be ambush
near hamlet. E
GVN activity under harassment.
Frequent sniping on routes to ham-
let; VC night activity in hamlet. D
Long range fire at night; VC
activity in adjacent hamlets in
Vil. Occasional sniping on routes
to hamlet. C
No incidents in hamlet during month;
infrequent harassments within vil-
lage or nearby. B
No incidents, including harassments
in Vil or near hamlet or on routes
to Vil during month. A
2. VC Political & Subversive
Activities
a. Hamlet Infrastructure
Party cadre underground by day but
free to intimidate populace at night.
No assurance party structure or
leaders uncovered. E
Members and most leaders of VC ham-
let organizations uncovered &
neutralized but undercover agents
still operative. _D_
Intel indicates most of Party
apparatus identified; some agents
under Vil or Dist control still
operative. _C_
All normal Party apparatus ident-
ified & dealt with; agents under
Vil or Dist control eliminated. A
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2. a. (cont.) No reason to doubt whole Party
apparatus eliminated or
neutral ized.
2. b. Village Infrastructure Despite some individual identifi-
cation, Vi 1 apparatus intact,
functioning E
Some Vi 1 cadre eliminated but
apparatus fairly effective _D_
Most key members of Vi 1 apparatus
identified, up to half neutralized;
effectiveness curtailed _C_
Most of Vi1 apparatus leaders elimi-
nated; almost all members identified.
Little coordinated VC activity in Vi 1 B
Vi 1 organization wiped out. Few
covert agents directed from outside
but stymied by friendly security
organizations. _A_
c. Activities Affecting VC apparatus can undermine GVN in
Hamlet hamlet by incidents ranging from
propaganda thru terrorism & sabot-
age, at least at night. E
No overt propaganda but terrorism
or sabotage during past month. D
No overt VC incidents in hamlet,
few signs of covert subversion. C
No subversion in hamlet & no in-
cidents in adjacent hamlets during
month. B
No subversive activity in Vi
1
during month. A
3. Security (Friendly No night defense except by external
Capabi 1
i
ties ) forces although required.
/j a. Hamlet Defense Plan
& Organization Day & night defense by external
forces. Local recruiting & training
underway.
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3. a. (cont.) Local warning & communication
systems operative; some armed
local defenders but main reli-
ance on RD cadre or external
defense.
Defense force organized; adequate
plan and communications for its
use.
Adequate defense force & adequate
defense plan following Prov RD
plan.
' b. Friendly External Force
(FEF) Assistance
FEF do not meet needs for arty,
air support, reaction ground forces,
etc. E
FEF meets needs but only effective
marginally, e.g., delayed response,
no night response, not aggressive,
etc.,
_D_
Availability and effectiveness of FEF
generally meet needs. C
Need for FEF less than C_; can be
met adequately. _B_
Need for FEF very slight; can be
met adequately C
C\ c. Internal Security
Activities
No agents, no intelligence from
public except possible sporadic police
informants. _E_
No complete intelligence system; a
few trained or voluntary informants
& some data from RD census griev-
ance work. D
Hamlet chief gets useful info from
informants, census grievance &/or
some volunteers.
Effective informant system; con-
siderable useful info from public. B
Hamlet Chief directs effective in-
ternal security apparatus; security
deputy, police, informant system,
willing public participation. A
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4. Administrative & Political
Activities
^ a. GVN Governmental
I
Management
Temporary or external GVN officials?
effective marginally, ususally
present only in daytime. E
Some local participation in hamlet
management; officials present usual-
ly only in daytime. _D_
Managerial groups resident; mostly
local appointed or elected, usual-
ly present at night. C
Complete managerial group is fully
resident; includes elected hamlet
chief & deputy; fully functioning
but with some external support. B
Elected, autonomous governing body,
under autonomous Vil; all officials
in hamlet & Vil resident. A
b. Census Grievance
Program
Only limited census activity; no
grievance program. E
Census grievance program started
systematically. _D_
Initial census grievance survey
complete; some individual grievances
being resolved. C
More GVN actions being taken to
meet people's grievances &
aspirations. B
Permanent GVN grievance represent-
ative in place. Substantial evidence




Minimal activity; public indiffer-
ence.
Regular and frequent activity even
if makeshift; public impact evident;
civic associations being developed. C
Systematic coverage; increased
awareness of govt programs & person-
nel. Increased numbers of ralHers;
people participating freely in
civic associations. B
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k. c. (cont.) Resident official executing
imaginative & regular program
Active public awareness of GVN
personnel, impending elections,
district programs, etc.; civic
actions active and effective
5. Health, Education &
Welfare
a . Med i ca 1 Services &
Sanitation
Only infrequent visits by MEDCAP
or cadre team
Only periodic, scheduled MEDCAP
or cadre team visits.
Full-time coverage by external
teams; includes sanitation in-
struction. C
Resident trained medic who supervises
sanitation & public health programs
with some public participation.
Trained midwife in hamlet or nearby. B
Resident trained medic continues
effective medical & sanitation
programs with general public parti-
cipation. Resupply of medicines
regular & adequate. A
l*Hb. Education No GVN-sponsored educational faci-lities; may be informal instruction
by Vi 1 elders, monks, Catholic priest E
Some formal instruction, not Full-
time, no permanent classrooms. D
Formal, full-time public primary
education program in permanent
classrooms but overcrowded or at
least 25% of children not enrolled. C
Virtually all children receive primary
education in permanent classrooms;
may be some adult classes. B
All children receive primary education
in permanent classrooms; secondary
school accessible; adult education
program. A
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5. c. Welfare No social welfare activity E
Some welfare activity to assist needy
families, but basic needs not cfeter-
mi ned • JD_
Basic needs determined, some being
met.
__C_
Basic needs being met; some special
benefits being paid by GVN B
Basic needs satisfied; special bene-
fits clarified & being paid; Benefit
channels continue to function. A
6. Economic Development
vt^a. Self Help Activity
None. E
People assist in selecting projects
but outsiders do most of work. _D_
Projects from RD plan chosen with
local consent & some participation
in those started. __C_
All programmed projects underway,
chosen to satisfy aspirations;
popular participation with outside
aid. _B_
Some projects completed; local pride
general; continuing external interest
and support for new projects. A
b. Public Works (require None planned or undertaken. E
outside expertise;
affect at least village) Some detailed planning for RD plan
projects. D
Planned projects suitable & meet
public needs; some work started. C
Priority projects underway; resources
at hand; people appreciative. B
Projects well along or completed;
public enthusiastic. A
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6. c. Economic Improvement None. E
Programs (Farming,
Fishing, Land Reform, Some planning; a few basic programs
etc.) started. _D_
Basic programs underway; people
enthusiastic. _C_
More advanced programs started;
increased popular support and
participation. _B_
Most programs well advanced in response
to popular demand and continuing
participation. A
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HAMLET PROBLEMS DURING MONTH
Select the one best answer for each section of each question
1
.
Incidents by friendly elements adversely affecting relations with
hamlet populace .
a. US mi litary .
(1) None or very few j (2) Minor only ; (3) Serious enough to
cause active resentment ; (k) Not applicable ; (5) Unknown .
b. Other FWAMF .
(1) None or very few j (2) Minor only j (3) Serious enough to
cause active resentment ; (k) Not applicable ; (5) Unknown .
c. ARVN -.
(1) None or very few ; (2) Minor only ; (3) Serious enough to
cause active resentment ; (k) Not applicable ; (5) Unknown .
d. RF/PF .
(1) None or very few ; (2) Minor only ; (3) Serious enough to
cause active resentment j (k) Not applicable ; (5) Unknown .
e. RD Cadre .
(1) None or very few j (2) Minor only ; (3) Serious enough to
cause active resentment ; (k) Not applicable ; (5) Unknown •
2. Corruption or tyranny of hamlet or village officials .
(1) No indications ; (2) Rumored ; (3) Suspected but no proof j
(k) Solid indication ; (5) Unknown .
3. Support of RD programs effort by hamlet officials .
(1) Enthusiastic and active ; (2) Sympathetic but inactive ;
(3) Indifferent j (k) Uncooperative ; (5) Actively opposed .
k. GVN-provided salaries ,
a. For RF/PF .
(1) n time ; (2) In arrears each month ; (3) In arrears more
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than one month ; (k) Unknown ; (5) Inapplicable .
b. For local staff
.
(1) On time ; (2) In arrears each month ; (3) In arrears more
than one month ; (k) Unknown ; (5) Inapplicable ;
c. For school teachers ,
(1) On time ; (2) In arrears each month ; (3) In arrears more
than one month ; (k) Unknown ; (5) Inapplicable .
5. Supplies for self-help construction projects .
On time and adequate ; (2) Delayed but adequate ; (3) Inadequate
and delayed ; (k) Promised but none received ; (5) None promised .
6. Tax collection (in kind and/or in cash) .
(1) GVN only ; (2) GVN and VC ; (3) None ; (k) VC only .
7. Condition of main routes from hamlet to village center .
(1) In good repair, adequate for current traffic ; (2) Being repaired
or improved (relocated, new bridge, etc.) ; (3) Difficult or danger-
ous to travel because of poor repair ; (k) Cart track, foot path, or
shallow waterway ; (5) Impassable (flooded, bridge out, stream dried
up, etc.)
.
8. Support of hamlet self-defense force other than PF by district and/or
province officials .
(1) Received funds and/or arms and ammunition as needed ;
(2) Have received arms and ammunition but inadequate ;
(3) Receives no outside support ;








The following are some tentative questions to be used in a counter
-
insurgency allegiance questionnaire. It is to be emphasized that the
following questions are given only as examples and in many cases would
require additional thought and effort as to type and format.
For the construction of the attitude scale, these questions should
be rephrased into short statements. It is felt that little accuracy and
reliability would be lost by constructing the scale with statements and
testing with questions.
The answers to the following questions that we would wish to hear
are obvious to those of us in this country. The trouble is that the
answers we want to hear may be obvious to the villagers themselves and
we want to stay away from that kind of situation as much as possible.
After consulting those familiar with the country and those familiar with
the people with which we'll be working, we may find that the statement/
endorsement methodology is more effective than the questionnaire approach.
Perhaps it is the simplicity of the questions that is bothersome.
It's quite possible that the questions could be couched in terms so that
they wouldn't be quite so obvious. Also, a greater percentage of them
should probably be written negatively so that a whole raft of affirmative
answers would not automatically indicate wholehearted government alle-
giance.
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A. (1) Would you be willing to serve on the police force of your village?
(2) Would you accept a position of responsibility in your village if
the government requested you to do so?
(3) Are the VC, in your opinion, trying to unite North and South
Vietnam and establish good government?
B. (1) If you know of a planned VC ambush, would you warn the government
forces?
(2) If you knew that a member of your village were working for the VC,
would you report him to the government?
(3) Would you report the location of a VC mine if you knew where it
was?
(k) Would you be willing to serve on a government intelligence net?
C. (1) Have there been any pro-government meetings or rallies in your
vi 1 lage?
(2) Would you attend such a meeting or rally?
(3) If you could have either one, would you rather read a government
newspaper or a VC newspaper?
D. (1) If you had children, would you like to have them attend a school
that was built and sponsored by the government?
(2) Would you willingly help rebuild a school that had been destroyed
or damaged by the VC?
(3) Do you think teachers should teach about and support the government?
E. (1) Do you believe government supporters and sympathizers are adequate-
ly protected from the VC?
(2) In your opinion, are the government laws fair and just for all?
(3) If you had a dispute with a neighbor, would you go to the govern-
ment police and courts for settlement?
(4) Do you agree with the government policy of severe punishment for
those convicted of political, economic, or other crimes against
the security of the country?
F. (1) Who, in your opinion, is responsible for the security and general
well-being of your village, the VC or the government?
(2) If the VC destroyed the effects of a Civic Action team, would you
willingly help to rebuild it?
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(3) Are the government teams or forces helping your village build what
you think needs to be built?
G. (1) Do you feel safe whenever you must travel along the roads or
waterways?
(2) Who controls the roads and other transportation means in the area,
the government or the VC?
(3) Are communications between villages adequate for your village's
needs?
H. (1) Would you be willing to work with the VC underground?
(2) Would you be unhappy if your son joined the government armed
forces?
(3) If you were able to serve in the armed forces, would you rather
join the VC or the government forces?
I. ( 1 ) To whom would you sell your rice if both the government and the
VC offered to buy it for the same price?
(2) Would you pay taxes to the VC if they promised not to use force
to col 1ect them?
(3) Do you think it's unfair to have to pay taxes to the government?
(k) Do you try to hide or find some way to avoid the government tax
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